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Introduction 
The Theoretical Humanitarian Non-State Actor 
Let us imagine a humanitarian crisis. A state government is carrying out a genocide on an ethnic minority, take 
for example the “genocide against the Tutsi” in Rwanda1. States have to make a decision of whether or not to 
engage in a humanitarian intervention. If a state does not intervene an IGO such as the UN peacekeepers may 
be called on for assistance. In the case of Rwanda, the UN intervened but was not able to intervene properly 
due to the limits of the legal rules of engagement. The international community sat back and watched the 
violence unfold which resulted in the death of up to 1,000,000 people.2 Eventually, the genocide was ended by 
the Ugandan backed RPF, an internal non-state actor who later became the ruling government of Rwanda. 
Internal actors can have their own political agenda and in the case of Rwanda, the RPF is accused of carrying 
out its' own war crimes and killing thousands of Hutu civilians in retaliation to the genocide.3 This case and 
others like it show that internal non-state actors are not always the best option for an intervention. Thus, when 
states are unwilling to intervene and IGOs are incapable of providing adequate assistance due to legal 
restrictions, there must be some other international actor capable of preventing the death toll from rising 
further by engaging in a humanitarian intervention. 
Let us now imagine an adequate third option, an international actor for humanitarian intervention, the self-
proclaimed 'humanitarian non-state actor.' This actor would have to only engage in intervention where 
permissible, as outlined in chapter one. It must be considered a morally legitimate actor, as outlined in chapter 
two. The intervention must then be carried out in a way that maintains the actor's legitimacy, as outlined in 
chapter three. Such an actor could be useful when traditional options (states and IGOs) are unwilling to 
intervene or are restricted from doing so adequately for any number of reasons. By intervening when states 
cannot, or would not do as well of a job, the humanitarian actor could provide a service for the good of 
humanity whenever intervention is deemed permissible. Everything may sound well and good but is this actor 
legitimate, morally or otherwise to carry out such an intervention? Could this institution lend itself to abuse or 
carry out illegitimate interventions as well? I think a legitimate 'humanitarian non-state actor' is possible, but 
only within the confines of very strict rules and criteria that must be met before even beginning to consider 
carrying out a legitimate intervention. Assuming the criteria laid out can be met and that the arguments are 
sound, it seems as though we could posit a new type of legitimate actor in geopolitics. One of a different nature 
than anything we have seen before. The role of such an actor would be clear, a last line of defense for civilians 
who's human rights are being grossly violated. Humanity would no longer have to watch from the sidelines 
                                                 
1 Edmund Kagire, Genocide Against the Tusti: It's Now Official. 
2 UN, Rwanda a Bi ref History of the Country. 
3 Christopher Black, Kagame's Mass Atrocities in Rwanda and the Congo. 
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when states or IGO's are limited by legal or political factors. 
Humanitarian intervention 
In 1859 John Stuart Mill wrote the seminal paper A Few Words on Non-intervention discussing when and what 
role states should play in enforcing humanitarian rights in other sovereign lands4. In recent times, the 
discussion of humanitarian intervention has become very popular since humanitarian intervention has become 
an increasingly important factor in global politics. This was made all the more evident when people questioned 
President Obama's reticence towards sending troops to Syria after President Assad's use of chemical weapons5. 
Humanitarian intervention has become so commonplace that President Obama not engaging in an intervention 
was seen as atypical behavior from a major world leader, or at least worthy of asking why intervention did not 
occur. This is important as states are usually the first called on for intervention, and the more powerful states at 
that. But another equally important question is, if the the US or states (or IGOs) around the world will not help, 
who could help intervene to bring safety to people caught in the crossfire? The first question is very prescient 
and outlined in President Obama's recent article in The Atlantic where he laid out his "Obama Doctrine."6 The 
second question is what is most important to my endeavors, as it would appear there should be some sort of 
body of legitimate actors permitted to intervene on humanitarian grounds when powerful states are not willing 
to or cannot for political or other reasons.  
A loosely defined version of an “international humanitarian intervention force” has been hypothesized by 
authors Patrick Emerton and Toby Handfield and will be factored in for consideration7. Their argument is not 
fleshed out in its entirety and merely states that there is perhaps an international moral need of such a force, 
but they do not attempt to show how such an institution would look and operate.8 Others have alluded to or 
mentioned the need of an 'international police force', perhaps an IGO, perhaps an independent worldwide 
militia or some other formulation.9 The need for such an institution is clear, a state-neutral police or 
intervention force that acts  to ensure the rights of people around the world could be a very good thing if 
created and operated properly10. 
The central question of my paper will therefore be, could a non-state actor legitimately engage in a 
humanitarian intervention? Humanitarian intervention here will be considered the use of military action, for 
the purposes of securing peace and safety for civilians, against states that commit human right's violations.11 
This is in contrast to humanitarian aid which does not provide military defense. 
                                                 
4 Particularly, whether or not states should intervene. John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-intervention. 
5 Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine. 
6 Goldberg. 
7 Patrick Emerton and Toby Handfield, Humanitarian Intervention and the Modern State System, 17. 
8 Emerton and Handfield, 17-19. 
9 Jonathan Glover, Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover, 248. 
10 Glover, 247-9. 
11  When the word intervention is used it will be assumed to be humanitarian intervention unless otherwise noted. 
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I will be investigating the nature of a non-state version of just such an institution. The focus is to see whether it 
is even possible for such an institution to exist on a theoretical basis and as such the most plausible form will be 
imagined.  To determine this I will investigate the particular case of whether or not a theoretical 'humanitarian 
non-state actor' could engage in humanitarian intervention in a legitimate way and what this would look like if 
possible. If this is possible, there may be room for many other types of non-state actors, but first it is important 
to see if even one such non-state actor could exist.  
Why the focus on non-state actors though? First, there are many complaints of impartiality, such as worries of 
imperialism or political desires factoring into a state's decisions to intervene (discussed briefly in the first 
chapter). Because of this, people do not consider major world powers to be legitimate actors for intervention in 
many particular cases. Hence the desire by many to have an international policing body of some sort (though I 
am not actually positing a police force but an international humanitarian intervention force), therefore a non-
state intervention force could be of practical relevance. Second, there is a gap in the philosophical literature and 
non-state actors have not been thoroughly considered as possible international intervention forces. The main 
focus is generally on regional IGOs like NATO or global IGOs like the UN. Much of the discussion surrounding 
non-state actor's roles in humanitarian intervention in philosophy and political theory deals with violent non-
state actors with state-like, criminal or terrorist goals that cause unrest and abuse human rights.12 I will argue in 
favor of a different type of non-state actor which is solely concerned with humanitarian rights and intervention 
and potentially avoids many of the concerns faced by states. 
Unfortunately, most of the literature regarding the legitimacy of actors in humanitarian intervention is in direct 
reference to states or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Most references to non-state actors in this 
literature deals with aid groups (non-militant), internal political actors, and violent non-state armed groups. To 
assess the legitimacy of non-state actors in humanitarian intervention I will have to adapt many of these 
readings to suit my interests, while keeping in mind their original context. I will not discuss aid groups or violent 
non-state armed groups, as the former does not engage militarily, and the latter  does not meet the moral 
criteria that is essential to this argument. Some readings of internal political actors will factored in. Most 
interpretations will come from discussions of state and IGO legitimacy. For the purposes of determining the 
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, the theoretical non-state actor would be most similar to a state or IGO. 
Of course the differences are immense in terms of structure and purpose but in the specific case of when 
state's and IGOs are permitted to intervene and what makes their intervention legitimate, there are many 
corollaries. 
To understand the legitimacy of non-state actors in intervention we must first look at the permissibility of 
intervention and then determine whether non-state actors could be considered legitimate in comparison to 
                                                 
12 Robert O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, 296. 
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states.  Chapter one offers an analysis into the minimal criteria for permissible intervention in a sovereign 
territory by appealing to universal human rights. Chapter two looks at what constitutes a legitimate actor for 
intervention. Chapter three provides a brief investigation into how legitimacy can be maintained when carrying 
out an intervention given all of the previous conditions. By discussing when intervention is permissible, and 
which actors can be considered legitimate, we can reach a conclusion on whether non-state actors can be 
considered as legitimate as state actors. We can then assess how state and non-state actors should potentially 
intervene in humanitarian crises. I am not trying to argue for the necessity of a non-state intervention force, but 
if all of the legitimacy criteria can be met and there is an adequately human rights preserving method of 
intervention for non-state actors, then they could legitimately carry out humanitarian intervention in situations 
where states or IGOs are reluctant to do so. 
 
1.Permissibility to Engage in Intervention 
When discussing the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention it is helpful to begin with discussing what makes 
humanitarian intervention permissible in the first place. In order to ultimately assess the legitimacy of 
humanitarian interventions, it will only be necessary to show that sovereignty can be lost or impugned 
(according to a minimally plausible criteria) and that humanitarian intervention is therefore permissible on such 
states. This is not meant as an attack on sovereignty as sovereignty is a valuable and necessary component of 
states. Rather, this is meant to probe the moral limits of when a state loses its sovereignty and must face 
consequences for its actions.  
Sovereignty and Non-Intervention 
In a humanitarian intervention it is implicit that the state being intervened on has lost its sovereignty. This is 
due to that fact “the prohibition of intervention 'is a corollary of every state's right to sovereignty.'“ 13 Or put 
another way, the right to non-intervention comes, by definition, with a state being sovereign, lose your 
sovereignty and you lose your right to non-intervention. We must first look at what role sovereignty plays in 
these affairs and then look at human rights to show exactly how sovereignty can be lost and allow for 
humanitarian intervention.  
Sovereignty was originally understood as the absolute authority over a state (here referred to as factual 
sovereignty), but this view is seen as outdated.14 Sovereignty today is generally understood to be the 
(politically) legitimate15 authority of a state (here termed legitimate sovereignty or sovereignty as legitimacy).  
In the 1992 essay Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct, Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss point out this 
                                                 
13 Sir Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention in Contemporary International Law, 2. 
14 Wood, 3. Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty is no Longer Sacrosanct, 1-5 (my pagination is different from 
the original print and will assume p1 as p95). 
15 Politically legitimate refers to the political theory definition of the word. 
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modern redefinition of sovereignty; "that a states [political] legitimacy can determine its sovereignty gives this 
term a completely new meaning."16 An implication of this is that political legitimacy can be lost. And since 
modern sovereignty requires political legitimacy, then sovereignty can be lost when a state is not politically 
legitimate. According to Chopra and Weiss, sovereignty traditionally maintained a more narrow view whereby 
sovereign states were those that were recognized by other sovereign states (what could be called legal 
sovereignty, an external reaffirmation of factual sovereignty) 17. Because of this, states historically had the right 
to non-intervention by virtue of being recognized by other states18. With the advent of sovereignty as 
legitimacy (legitimate sovereignty) however, the right to non-intervention is being redefined. The right to non-
intervention may still “remain a well established part of international law“19 but is no longer seen as applicable 
to all states but only applicable to legitimately sovereign states. 
Before the turning point in political theory toward legitimate sovereignty, as noted by Chopra and Weiss, there 
were questions about whether factual sovereignty was enough to constitute non-intervention. Looking at John 
Stuart Mill's A Few Words on Non-Intervention, Mill cautions against exerting one's own state's beliefs on other 
states. Yet, he also admits that there is a time to go to war (for the purposes of intervention) even when not 
provoked and calls on ethical and political philosophers to take up the task of finding a reasonable test to 
determine when that is20. Over one hundred years later, Michael Walzer took up the call and codified the 
foundations of Just War Theory in his Just and Unjust Wars of 1977. In it he argues that "we praise or don't 
condemn these violations of the formal rules of sovereignty, because they uphold the values of individual life 
and communal liberty of which sovereignty itself is merely an expression."21  The 'violations of the formal rules 
of sovereignty' being referred to are interventions.22 This is an early formulation of the modern idea that once a 
state is no longer considered (politically) legitimate (by his definition, not upholding values of individual life and 
communal liberty), then it is no longer sovereign, and thus loses its right to non-intervention.23 Legitimate 
sovereignty is now considered inextricably linked to non-intervention, this can be seen in humanitarian 
interventions in the last 25 years as well as in shifting attitudes.24 If it is certainly possible for a state to lose its 
legitimate sovereignty and its right to non-intervention then the next logical question is, when exactly does a 
state lose its legitimate sovereignty?25 
                                                 
16 Chopra and Weiss, 6. 
17 Ibid., 7. 
18 Wood, 1-2. Chopra and Weiss 2-6. 
19 Wood, 2. 
20 Mill, 3. 
21 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 108. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Chopra & Weiss, 8. Dobos, 8. Walzer, xvi. 
24 Jane Stromseth, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, 247-248. 
25 Legitimate sovereignty will sometimes be referred to as simply sovereignty to not confuse it with other notions of 
legitimacy. 
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From Sovereignty to Human Rights 
The task now is to show when a state actually loses their legitimate sovereignty and thus loses their right to 
non-intervention. In recent history there is only one truly universal criteria for a state to lose their legitimate 
sovereignty, gross violations of human rights. When discussing humanitarian intervention, Michael Walzer gave 
an intuitive account that helps lay the foundation for my understanding of permissible intervention: 
Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable expectations of 
success) to acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind." The old-fashioned language 
seems to me exactly right. It is not the conscience of political leaders that one refers to in such 
cases... The reference is to the moral convictions of ordinary men and women, acquired in the 
course of their everyday activities.26 
The standard of having to shock mankind's moral conscience is quite strict, but in the minimally plausible view I 
put forward, I think we can agree that at the very least, 'acts “that shock the moral conscience of mankind,”'  do 
justify intervention.27 For an act to shock the moral conscience of mankind one must appeal to the moral 
conscience of mankind, or universal human rights.28 The attempt here is to show that there are minimally 
plausible criteria, such as the violation of universal human rights, that can be universally agreed upon as 
impugning a state's legitimate sovereignty by virtue of shocking the moral conscience of mankind. Allen 
Buchanan argued in his 2008 paper Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order that "Only such 
universal [human] rights could justify the kinds of restraints on sovereignty and even on the self-determination 
of democratic peoples that the international legal order now attempts to impose."29 And this is where we are 
today. It seems that only universal human rights violations, alluded to by Mill and Walzer and explicitly stated 
by Buchanan and others30, are capable of infringing on the sovereignty of states. This was seen in interventions 
such as Operation Provide comfort which was praised for its success in protecting Kurd's. Expanding this 
argument to the argument in the last section it can now be said that when a state violates universal human 
rights, it loses its right to non-intervention. This makes the issue of when it is permissible to intervene on a 
state a moral concern.  
 
Universal Human Rights  
As seen in the last section, violations of universal human rights can lead to state's losing their right to non-
                                                 
26 Walzer, 107. 
27 Walzer, 107.J. L. Holzgrefe, and Robert O. Keohane Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas. Allen Buchanan, Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order,26. 
28 Some think sovereignty is lost at much higher levels than this or that the debate is inherently flawed . J. L. Holzgrefe, 
Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas, 50. 
29 Buchanan, 72. 
30 J. L. Holzgrefe, and Robert O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. 
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intervention. It is therefore important to understand universal human rights. I will try to take the least 
controversial definition and interpret it into a minimally plausible account for the purposes of determining 
when the right to non-intervention is lost. Universal human rights can best be summed up by saying, there 
exists common rights, such as rights to life, security, etc., inherent to all by virtue of being human. However, the 
concept of universal human rights is quite contentious among philosophers and political theorists and is often 
criticized as perhaps being too idealistic and for not addressing concerns surrounding cultural relativism. 
George Cristian Maior mentions the concept of universal human rights has been accused of being "a tool for 
promoting a type of 'cultural imperialism' outside a cohesive cultural and ideological space, bounded by a 
particular religion – Christianism – and a specific political ideology - liberalism."31 In this conception, universal 
human rights may just be the product of Western Liberalism and is merely used as a tool to justify intervention, 
even when Western Liberalism is not accepted universally, a problem also known as the 'parochialism 
objection'. Alan Buchanan simplifies the 'parochialism objection' as, "the mistake of thinking that what happens 
to be valued from the perspective of some particular culture or type of society is universally valuable."32This is a 
legitimate concern when dealing with humanitarian intervention as one does not want to see 'cultural 
imperialism' taking place and if truly universal human rights do not exist then by what measure can a state lose 
its legitimate sovereignty for purposes of intervention? The answer is there could be a truly universal 
conception of human rights that transcends cultural borders and perhaps avoids the concern that universal 
human rights is merely an excuse to impose one's values on others. If there exists any view of human rights 
which can be universally accepted, then humanitarian intervention can be considered permissible in cases 
where those universal human rights are violated. 
The Minimally Plausible Account of Universal Human Rights 
Many people have weighed in on this debate but I would like to put forward a minimally plausible view of 
human rights for the purposes of permitting humanitarian intervention. Historically, gross violations of human 
rights such as massacres, genocide, and systematic uses of force by states (this term applies to programs such 
as those enforced by Mao, Pol Pot and others) have been considered "acts 'that shock the moral conscience of 
mankind'" such that they permit humanitarian intervention. These violations of human rights seem to be 
uncontentious enough that I believe they may act as a minimal criteria for universal human rights to permit 
intervention. This does not mean only genocide and other gross offenses are the only human rights violations 
worthy of intervention. Lesser violations of human rights may also warrant intervention, but probing these ends  
is not the main concern of this paper. 
Though this is not a very nuanced argument, it should be plausible enough that one could accept this as a very 
                                                 
31 George Cristian Maior, Human Rights: Political Tool or Universal Ethics, 6. 
32 Buchanan, 72. 
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minimal account of universal human rights. These gross violations do not necessarily suffer from the critiques 
of universal human rights as noted by Maior33 or Buchanan.34 Denouncing genocide, murder, and systematic 
use of force against a state's own population transcends Christianism and Liberalism and appeals instead to 
human rights to life and decency. Also, assuming that all people denounce these gross violations of human 
rights, Buchanan's parochialism objection can be avoided, and it does not seem like many people would 
condone such actions. Therefore, the minimally plausible view of human rights shows that, in some instances, 
universal human rights can exist and if there exists some notion of universal human rights then one can use 
them as criteria to compare states.35 To build this onto the existing argument, when a state violates the 
minimally plausible account of universal human rights, it loses its legitimate sovereignty and loses its right to 
non-intervention. Thus it is morally permissible to intervene on a state that has violated the minimally plausible 
account of universal human rights. 
When discussing humanitarian intervention, it should be noted that a less demanding view of human rights can 
be beneficial to ensure the intervention is permissible in the first place as well as to maintain legitimacy in the 
intervention while avoiding turning the intervention into a political debate. Humanitarian intervention, is 
supposed to be about securing the human rights of those whose rights are being violated, it is not meant to be 
a posturing move to take political stances on issues. Thus humanitarian intervention is by definition carried out 
on moral grounds but as has now been show, its permissibility and legitimacy rely on a concept of universal 
human rights that must be upheld as only appeal to such universal human rights can even allow for a state to 
lose its legitimate sovereignty for the purposes of intervention. 
We continue to see perceived legitimate humanitarian intervention in the world, such as efforts against IS, as 
well as citizens of states in which there are rampant human rights violations asking for intervention. As a result 
of being faced with this reality, it is crucial that we understand the reality of humanitarian intervention. 
Intervention always undermines sovereignty, that is the entire point.36  That the once sovereign power in a 
region has lost their authority and needs to be replaced and or defeated, sometimes by force, is a political 
reality that one wishes avoidable, then need only look at Rwanda or Kosovo and think otherwise. Though the 
debate rages on about the legal framework of such an intervention I think the reality on the ground of people 
being massacred, genocide being committed and states using systematic force against their own citizens shows 
the need for humanitarian intervention at the least in these most dire of circumstances. This is where the 
invocation of human rights comes into play. If humanitarian intervention is the only justification for a state 
having its legitimate sovereignty impugned and since we can conceive of a minimally plausible view of human 
                                                 
33 Maior, 6. 
34 Buchanan, 75. 
35 Martha Nussbaum, Women And Human Development, 35. 
36 Walzer, 108. 
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rights violations (that includes massacres, genocide, and systematic use of force against a state's own 
population), we can then conceive of morally sound justifications for the right of actors to intervene in 
sovereign territory. Thereby concluding that intervention in defense of universal human rights is certainly 
permissible in some cases. This moral foundation is what the rest of the arguments will build on. Since 
humanitarian intervention is permissible only with appeal to morality via universal human rights, then the 
legitimacy of actors and the way an actor maintains legitimacy in carrying out an intervention, must also appeal 
morality via universal human rights. So far, there is nothing that requires the actors involved in an intervention 
to be states. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, while the permissibility in intervention may not differ 
whether the actor is a state or non-state actor, the notion of whether an actor is legitimate in carrying out an 
intervention does include differences between states and non-state actors. 
 
2. Determining Legitimacy in Intervention 
Having seen that intervention on humanitarian grounds is permissible we now turn to the notion of when the 
actors in an intervention are considered themselves legitimate. Generally speaking, an actor is considered 
politically legitimate when it has the right to rule over some population (as political legitimacy is typically 
applied to states)37. In humanitarian intervention, an intervening party is considered legitimate when it has 
secured the right to intervene (intervention legitimacy or legitimacy in intervention).  
Legitimacy in intervention can be broken down in two subgroups. Internal legitimacy, which is primarily a 
concern for states as will be shown, and external legitimacy, which is a concern for states and non-states alike. 
Among these external legitimacy worries are legal legitimacy, UN authorization- a subset of legal legitimacy- 
and moral legitimacy. Following up with the unique roles of states in intervention and the differences between 
states and non-state actors regarding political legitimacy should exhaust our investigation into the intervention 
legitimacy of non-state actors.  
The internal and external legitimacy criteria presented by various authors are typically in reference to states or 
IGOs. As will be seen, nothing seems to exclude the possibility of non-state actors as being legitimate for 
humanitarian intervention. I will argue that a humanitarian non-state actor could be legitimate in intervention 
by investigating the internal and external means of intervention legitimacy and the differences between states 
and non-state actors. 
Internal Legitimacy 
Internal legitimacy is the first pressing concern. The idea behind internal legitimacy is that a government 
waging a humanitarian intervention cannot unreasonably infringe on its citizens.38 As Buchanan puts it, “How 
                                                 
37 Buchanan, 105. 
38 Ned Dobos Is Unilateral Intervention Always Unethical?, 4. 
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can the government of a state morally justify humanitarian intervention to its own citizens? “39 The issue is with 
the obligation to subject a state's people to all that a humanitarian intervention entails, paying for the 
intervention, sending troops, dealing with fallout, etc. This presents a large problem for states and has been 
seen several times in the last few decades when states engage in questionable interventions with a heavy price 
on their domestic population. States as such have to consider internal legitimacy heavily before waging a 
humanitarian intervention and before even considering external legitimacy. The idea is more complex when 
extended to the theoretical idea of a 'humanitarian non-state actor' however. The question at hand is whether 
the hypothetical non-state actor needs to worry about internal legitimacy in the same manner as states or if 
this can be got around with other means. 
Presumably, the 'humanitarian non-state actor' posited does not have the exact same worries justifying 
intervention to its members as its membership is explicitly consent based, that is, not based on some social 
contract theory or tacit consent. The 'humanitarian non-state actor' also has the terms for humanitarian 
intervention explicitly laid out as this is its primary function, meaning these terms in particular have been 
consented to. Thus, while the state actor must morally justify interventions to their citizens, the humanitarian 
non-state actor does not have the same obligation. 
There are many other criteria the 'humanitarian non-state actor' must fulfill: it cannot not violate its charter 
members' human rights, or the human rights of those it is helping through intervention, or its donors rights. 
Truly, it cannot violate any human rights, as the categorical advocacy of such a position is the only means of 
providing any notion of intervention legitimacy for the non-state actor.  
A large concern over a state's internal legitimacy is whether citizens of the state are obligated specifically to pay 
for the intervention or not. In fact, this can shake a state's internal legitimacy in intervention if the citizens are 
not ultimately obligated or willing to pay or if doing so would be too burdensome.40 On the other hand, if a 
non-state actor intervenes there are no citizens required to pay the bill, only parties that have agreed to the 
tenets of the organization and have agreed to help further those goals with support through membership or 
donation. Hence, tacit consent and obligation are not issues for the 'humanitarian non-state actor' because 
people explicitly consent to supporting it. 
Internal legitimacy thus seems to be a problem only for states. The hypothetical non-state actor would have a 
strict charter or constitution relying on the gross violations of human rights as the moral basis for intervention, 
making it inherently internally legitimate. As well, its founding and continuation would have to be entirely 
membership based with members explicitly agreeing to support the conditions of the charter and agreeing to 
                                                 
39 Buchanan, 202. 
40 Buchanan, 202-6. 
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donate anonymously41. Given that the terms of humanitarian intervention are explicitly laid out and consented 
to before any member joins, a non-state actor will be considered internally legitimate by definition. 
 
Legal Legitimacy and UN authorization 
Humanitarian intervention is a moral matter, and supposed to be carried out to help fellow people of the world. 
The moral component of defending people from human rights violations I believe outweighs authorization from 
international legal powers. (This will  nonetheless be considered, even if it cannot here be exhausted). The idea 
behind legal legitimacy is that if an actor can work within the confines of international law and the 
accountability therein, then it is at least legally legitimate42 in carrying out an intervention in the eyes of other 
states and state institutions (that is, externally legitimate).This is important because legal legitimacy can provide 
accountability for the intervening actor making them more legitimate in intervention. Nonetheless, as will be 
argued later, legal legitimacy is not the only criteria capable of providing intervention legitimacy for actors. 
Private Military Companies or PMCs may be the closest existing correlate to my proposed humanitarian non-
state actor, and looking into their legal status may shed some light on the intervention legitimacy of the 
humanitarian non-state actor. P. R. Kalidhass43 looked into the international legal accountability of PMCs and 
found that they can fall under 3 categories: “combatants, mercenaries, or civilians “44. Such a state of affairs can 
lead to civilian-contractors occupying “a relatively ambiguous legal status, which leads to an almost complete 
absence of legal prosecution even when the accusations of wrongdoing arguably amounts to international 
crime.”45 This would be a major problem for an actor working under its own directives in an armed conflict, as 
accountability is a necessary requirement for maintaining legitimacy (see chapter three). Here lies a conceptual 
issue: any defender of universal human rights must also uphold human rights in the process, but without 
accountability there is no instrument for ensuring this will happen. Of course, accountability does not prevent 
human rights violations, but it can prevent future violations by perhaps disbanding imposing limitations, or 
preventing that institution from engaging in armed conflict. For these purposes, non-state actors would most 
likely need to fall under the legal definition of combatants for humanitarian intervention, as they are certainly 
not ordinary civilians. Further, unlike mercenaries, they are not hired, but work under they own directives.  and 
are not hired but operate under their own directives, unlike mercenaries. However, this raises another problem. 
As Kalidhass states, “a Combatant is someone who is legally entitled to take direct part in hostilities during an 
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armed conflict.”46 But international law does not necessarily have the mechanisms already in place to 
adequately recognize non-state actors for the purposes of humanitarian intervention47. The fact that there is no 
law providing legal legitimacy and thus accountability for non-state actors, does not however make the entire 
institution illegitimate. There is a lack of accountability in place in the international legal framework at present 
but perhaps that could change. A potential pre-emptive solution to this is to attempt to become party to 
international human rights and war treaties as well as attempt to be granted UN authorization before 
intervening in a situation, although these institutions only include states, and their scope should therefore be 
expanded. Provided states are willing to do such a thing, this could help contribute a good deal of external 
legitimacy for intervention. 
To further investigate legality as a means for intervention we should continue by looking specifically at the most 
relevant international body for humanitarian intervention, the UN. In Is Unilateral Intervention Always 
Unethical? Ned Dobos investigated the role UN authorization can play in legitimating a humanitarian 
intervention. He believes that “UN authorisation (or lack thereof) can have some indirect bearing on the moral 
status of a humanitarian intervention. That is, it can affect whether an intervention satisfies other widely 
accepted justifying conditions, such as proportionality, internal legitimacy, and likelihood of success."48 Internal 
legitimacy has been looked at and dismissed as a worry for the hypothetical non-state actor, but the criteria of 
“49prudence” he sets forth is worth looking into. The criteria of prudence is similar to Walzer's just war theory,50 
according to Dobos, "the intervention must stand a reasonable prospect of success at an acceptable cost."51 
Dobos believes that UN authorization may spell the difference between a prudent and internally legitimate or 
not intervention. This can make authorization indirectly necessary, although he also states that this does not 
make it always necessary.52 Prudence would have to be heavily factored into considerations for a 'humanitarian 
non-state actor', as not following through on prudence could ultimately lead to the destruction of the non-state 
actor on the whole. A failed intervention could result in a loss of legitimacy for not upholding the mandates set 
out in the 'humanitarian non-state actor's' charter, and thus they may never be trusted to intervene again. Not 
adhering to prudence may even outright decimate the 'humanitarian non-state actor' if enough damage is 
inflicted, rendering it incapable of further intervention. Thus non-state actors would be much more concerned 
with notions of prudence than states, as their resources and scope is far more limited than a state. UN 
authorization therefore does not provide prudence or internal legitimacy as these are importantly figured out 
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by the 'humanitarian non-state actor' on its own before intervention even begins.  
Legal legitimacy may be difficult to ascertain at present, because it does not provide legal accountability for 
non-state actors as parties engaging on behalf of universal human rights. However, the lack of explicit legal 
accountability currently in place does not delegitimize intervention, as legal accountability could be adopted 
through third parties53. UN authorization on the other hand may stand as a larger obstacle. We will now look at 
whether lack of UN authorization can delegitimize an intervention.54  
The first concern Dobos addresses with UN authorization is the rights of the target state.55 As shown in the 
section on sovereignty, however, the rights of the target state can easily be questioned if not dismissed in the 
cases of human rights violations, as their sovereignty has been impugned in some way and the more relevant 
rights are those of the civilians affected. Dobos then argues that international vigilantism can be wrong not 
because it violates the target states rights but because it can wrong the international community56. The 
'humanitarian non-state actor' would operate on behalf of the international community via universal human 
rights. Assuming the actor is legitimate in intervention and upholds universal human rights, this objection is not 
a problem. The third issue he advances is that one could argue that contractual rights are being ignored. When 
UN authorization is denied to a state or IGO can still appeal to the UN charter and claim they were within their 
rights to carry out an intervention and ultimately get past such contractual worries if the appeal is successful. A 
non-state actor has no such claim if it is not signatory to the UN charter. It would have to be held accountable in 
international legal systems if wrong doing is perceived, just as if it were a signatory in that case but then they 
could appeal to the same aspects of the UN charter states and IGOs do to justify their interventions. As well, 
the non-state actor should attempt to become members and signatories to international treaties such as the 
UN. This can help provide further external legitimacy prevent other worries about legitimacy if accepted. There 
is of course another option and that is to seek external intervention legitimacy elsewhere, namely in the form 
of moral legitimacy. 
The notion of UN authorization concludes in much the same way as Dobos concluded it: UN authorization may 
not always be necessary but it can be beneficial for securing legitimacy in intervention. In the case of non-state 
actors it may even be wholly necessary if the non-state actor is not considered morally legitimate as will be 
discussed in the next section. However, legal legitimacy (a la UN authorization) only serves to show that 
external legitimacy can be extended to actors and implies that moral legitimacy and other criteria have been 
met.57  Because of this, moral legitimacy can be seen as more foundational as long as the other relevant criteria  
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have been met. 
Moral Legitimacy 
Moral legitimacy and internal legitimacy seem the most important of the legitimacy criteria because they could 
provide an adequate framework for what constitutes a legitimate intervening actor. Internal legitimacy and its 
importance has been discussed, while legal legitimacy has been shown to only be useful insofar as it confers 
moral legitimacy. If an actor is morally legitimate, legal legitimacy may not be completely necessary. As Chopra 
and Weiss note, the intervention to protect Kurd's after the Gulf War was a watershed moment as the 
intervention was itself unauthorized yet played an important role in successfully protecting Kurdish citizens.5859 
Whether the legal framework permits humanitarian intervention is thus irrelevant from a moral standpoint, as 
long as the actors are legitimate in other ways. If an intervening actor is morally legitimate and internally 
legitimate, legal legitimacy would only serve to codify such forms of legitimacy to the international powers that 
be. As such, legal legitimacy is not what does the actual work of making the institution externally legitimate, 
but can be advantageous for conferring external legitimacy in a codified way. 
Dobos advocated that UN authorization can be beneficial. However, he also gives this quote from Charles 
Krauthammer “'By what possible moral calculus does an American intervention to liberate 25 million people 
forfeit moral legitimacy because it lacks the blessing of the butchers of Tienanmen Square or the cynics of the 
Quai d’Orsay?'”60 And goes to say that “lack of approval from the UN does not always cast doubt on the moral 
credentials of an intervention in the way described earlier.” This is because of the major flaw of the veto power 
from the 5 permanent members of the UN security council. According to this rule, an almost unanimously 
decided and morally justified intervention can be vetoed by one of these 5 members and not be authorized 
despite being morally justified. Thus he concludes that “deadlock in international institutions seems inevitable. 
When it does arise...and authorisation for humanitarian intervention is withheld, this ought not be treated as a 
moral barrier to military action.”61 Implicit in this statement and others like it is the idea that lack of UN 
authorization does not prohibit military intervention from a moral standpoint. This is because, as noted before, 
intervention is itself carried out on moral grounds. Legal legitimacy can help secure an actors' right to 
intervene, but the intervention itself does not stem from legal obligations. Humanitarian intervention stems 
from perceived moral obligations; if these can be upheld and the intervention is morally legitimate both in 
cause and action, then there is no reason why legal legitimacy must be fundamentally necessary (though it may 
be a sufficient criteria in its own right). 
One glaring issue with using these arguments in favor of non-state actors is that they were designed and 
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articulated with states in mind as the actors of intervention. However, as the arguments have noted, moral 
legitimacy can be enough to make an intervention legitimate and legal authorization does not change that 
legitimacy. Provided the non-state actor intervenes in human rights preserving ways and has a legitimate right 
to intervention, it seems reasonable to ascribe the same notion of moral legitimacy to non-state actors as 
Dobos and the authors he mentions believe should be extended to states. The major difference between them 
is the function of political legitimacy and the ways in which external legitimacy can be achieved. 
What Makes States So Special? 
When looking at the legitimacy of institutions involved in humanitarian intervention it is important to look at a 
large difference between state and non-state actors; the notion of political legitimacy as conferred by citizens of 
a state to that state in order to govern. There is a special relation between citizens of a state and their 
government, and as long as the government maintains its sovereignty, as outlined in the first chapter, this 
special relation has many implications. This could make non-state actors not seem politically legitimate. I will 
argue that this is not the case. 
In a democracy, there is a transfer of power through consent (tacit or explicit, social contract theory debates 
this via Rousseau,Locke, Hobbes and their contemporaries) that legitimates the government of such a state. But 
regardless of whether a state is democratic or not, as long as the state is sovereign there is some, albeit loose, 
conference of political legitimacy to said state as well as external legitimacy by definition of its sovereignty. As 
well, there are principles of protection, adherence to law, etc. that bind both the state to the people and the 
people to the state, whether democratic or not. If the state is sovereign, the political legitimacy conferred by 
the citizens gives the government certain rights and obligations. States are obligated to protect their own 
citizens and their interests.62 This is what makes the issue of internal legitimacy so contentious for humanitarian 
intervention. In trying to help internationally, the state may take resources away from its own domestic 
population.63 Appealing to a natural duty of Justice, Allen Buchanan puts forth a solution to this issue. 
The classical view is that states are beholden only to their own people. Buchanan by contrast posits that states, 
like all people, have some sort of a natural duty to justice that can provide a moral framework for protecting the 
rights of all citizens of the world.64 Buchanan's solution seems to have a clear intuitive moral basis for the 
protection of people. With regards to states that maintain sovereignty there seems to be an intuitive moral 
imperative for them to not allow gross violations of human rights as preserving human rights across the world is 
in their interest to uphold a natural duty of justice.65 Couple this with the political legitimacy conferred to states 
by their citizens, and this makes states legitimate actors internally and externally for the purposes of 
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humanitarian intervention. This conference of political legitimacy to the state and the states obligations to its 
own citizens and citizens of the world (by Buchanan's view) proves a different type of legitimacy from that of 
non-state actors in intervention.  
Non-state actors do not have the same obligations as states: there are no conferences of power, no domestic 
citizens, and no moral obligations to protect the interests of said citizens. The basic tenets of states and non-
states are inherently different.  However, it does not seem this difference changes the legitimacy of non-state 
actors. Though there is no proper citizenry, the non-state actor is still obligated to uphold the rights of all 
people of the world (where prudent) in the same way as states. In the absence of a domestic citizenry their 
members and donors support can act as a sort of 'citizenry' for the purposes of conferring some political 
legitimacy.66 The non-state actor's right to exist/intervene would also be upheld until legal or moral convictions 
arise from other actors and deem the non-state actor's 'sovereignty'67 impugned. Political legitimacy is 
therefore conferred to the non-state actor by its members because it upholds its founding charter (which is 
founded on protecting universal human rights) and it can maintain such political legitimacy as long as it upholds 
its obligations to universal human rights to the people of the world (where prudent). Hence, political legitimacy 
for the non-state actor is different than for the state actor but in terms of the obligations a state has to its 
citizenry and the people of the world there is no large difference. 
There are beneficial differences between states and non-state actors as well. For one, there is more explicit 
consent on part of the non-state actor to its members such that internal legitimacy for the purposes of 
intervention is maybe even more morally justified than state actors. Also, since the scope of the non-state actor 
is all citizens of the world, then the actor does not need to be seen as legally legitimate by all states but by all 
people via universal human rights. The gulf between states and non-states in intervention is not as wide as may 
have been previously believed. Both can be considered legitimate actors in intervention provided they are 
internally and morally legitimate. There are other differences and potential benefits to consider but that is too 
much to get into for these purposes.  
 
3. How to Engage in Intervention               
Having demonstrated that humanitarian intervention is permissible and that non-state actors could be 
legitimate in intervention, we now turn to the question of how an actor should conduct a humanitarian 
intervention so as to maintain that legitimacy. Of course in humanitarian intervention, rules of conduct are 
necessary as securing human rights is the main objective. Thus the actors must not commit any human rights 
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violation, or else they may lose their moral legitimacy. As Walzer said “war is distinguishable from murder and 
massacre only when restrictions are established on the reach of battle.”68 Of course, he was referring 
specifically to wars between states and this essay is neither about wars or state nor on state conflict. However, 
he was also referring to 'just wars', and a conflict over preserving human rights based on the definition he gives 
of humanitarian intervention can be considered in some ways a 'just war'.69 There are still a few main questions 
that need to be answered to show that an intervention can be carried out in a legitimate way by a non-state 
actor, though they cannot be given as full attention as they need. Is it permissible for a non-state actor to attack 
and kill defending soldiers of a state? Is it permissible for a non-state actor to initiate defensive violence against 
defending solders? And what role should non-state actors play after the conflict? More importantly, do the 
answers to these questions change if the actor is a state or non-state? When it comes to how to maintain 
legitimacy in intervention there certainly are differences between state and non-state actors, but nothing 
prohibits non-state actors from maintaining legitimacy in intervention. 
Right to Self-Defense 
The first concern for carrying out a morally legitimate humanitarian intervention is the inevitable reality of 
killing. Regrettably, armed actors in interventions - even those with the explicit condition of non-aggression- 
may still need to defend themselves or local populations with force.  Can a non-state actor attack defending 
soldiers to secure protection of civilians whose human rights are being violated? This is a largely important 
question, as without an affirmative answer to this and the questions that follow, there is no reason for a non-
state actor to carry out an intervention in the first place, if doing so would make the actor lose its legitimacy in 
intervention and therefore be unable to provide any military assistance. The civilians affected in such situations 
are being protected by the intervening actor and their defense is the primary objective in an intervention. 
Therefore, self-defense in humanitarian intervention does not simply fall under the scope of self-defense of the 
intervening actor but includes self-defense of the civilians affected and intervening actor itself.  In instances 
such as the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) this right to self-defense, in order to protect 
civilians, was not adequately carried out leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands under the UN's 
watch.70 As such we must establish clear rights to self-defense of not just the actor itself but on behalf of the 
civilians being protected as well. 
On traditional views, actors have the right to protect themselves for self-defense, but this can apply to either 
side of a conflict (though perhaps in different proportions)71. One assumption often made in this reasoning is 
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that the soldiers defending a state committing human rights violations are implicit legitimate targets.72 Emerton 
and Handfield find this notion slightly more complicated. Rather than agreeing that “soldiers of the 
perpetrating state become liable to attack because they have a distinct causal connection to wrongdoing within 
[the state]”73,  they believe;  “A soldier who commits acts of violence in defense of a state whose sovereignty is 
impugned by serious wrongdoing is committing impermissible acts of violence, and hence is liable to defensive 
violence from the intervening soldiers.”74 This seems to be a good justification for attacking defending soldiers, 
and seems to provide an adequate moral framework upon which a non-state actor may create a code of 
conduct.  
If a soldier defends a state that has lost its legitimate sovereignty and the soldiers commit impermissible acts of 
violence, then they are no longer just tacitly responsible for their government's atrocities. They are then also 
committing their own impermissible acts of violence. Humanitarian intervention is meant to protect people 
against exactly  such “impermissible acts of violence” (or gross violations of human rights as spelled out above).  
With this is mind, an intervening actor has the right to defend itself against defending soldiers of a state, as 
protecting itself and the civilians affected is its primary objective in an intervention.  
If the intervention is permissible against a state that has committed such acts of impermissible violence (grossly 
violated human rights), then the actor is permitted to be present to help secure the safety of civilians. Thus, the 
defense of themselves and the civilians they are protecting falls under the notion of self-defense from a purely 
defensive and non-aggressive standpoint, and allows for self-defense against defending soldiers of a state. And 
if non-state actors are permitted to engage in the intervention and are morally legitimate, they, like any other 
actor as noted above, are also permitted to defend themselves and civilians to carry out their goals.  There is 
much more literature on the permissibility of killing enemy combatants, but for the strict purposes of 
intervention this seems the best iteration of moral values that should theoretically be both applicable to states 
and non-states alike. This is an extremely minimal view but aims to show that self-defense against defending 
soldiers of an illegitimate state is permissible, and that the protection of civilians falls under the scope of self-
defense as the intervening actor is acting on behalf of the civilians affected and as such is responsible for their 
protection.  
Initiating Defense 
Having established that it is morally permissible for actors to attack defending soldiers in self-defense, Emerton 
and Handfield move to the next question which occupies a moral gray area. Is it permissible to initiate 
defensive violence? They noted of state's carrying out humanitarian intervention that 
“were they to attempt to peacefully enter the state and take control of its buildings, imprison 
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its leaders and so on (which they are entitled to do, the state’s sovereignty being impugned), 
they would be subjected to impermissible violence by the defending soldiers. Hence, they 
enjoy some degree of privilege to initiate defensive violence against those defending 
soldiers.”75 
While I do not necessarily agree with the exact phrasing used, I do agree that the actions of an intervening 
actor make it “subject to impermissible violence by the defending soldiers” and I also agree that the intervening 
actor has some right to initiate defensive violence in such situations. This is not to outright condone actions of a 
morally questionable character. But in the instance of 'sufficient threat',76 the intervening party would have 
some right to initiate defensive violence against defending soldiers, though as with all things in war, there are 
many contingencies on this. 'Sufficient threat' such as that faced by Israel leading up to the six-day war was 
enough to justify Israel initiating self-defense according to Walzer.77 This is  an intuitive account. If an actor is 
legitimate in it's existence and permitted to be present in a conflict (or conflict is imminent), then the actor has 
the right to not be obliterated by an attacking force. If there is ample evidence of an imminent and 'sufficient' 
threat, then the actor may be permitted to initiate violence in order to defend itself.   
If an actor is permitted to legitimately intervene and able to defend themselves and the civilians they are 
protecting, as seen in the last section, then they must also be able to initiate attacks when under a 'sufficient 
threat.' The idea of self-defense is considered a morally sound concept by most if not all people when 
discussing war. There does not seem to be a qualitative difference between state and non-states for the 
purposes of self-defense if both have the right to be present in a situation where self-defense is justified (e.g. a 
morally legitimate humanitarian intervention). And if the notion of 'sufficient threat' is enough to justify 
preemptive attack for states, there is no reason it should not hold for non-states as well. 
State Building 
While states (or sometimes IGO's) may be in the business of state-building post-conflict, this would not 
necessarily be the case for a non-state actor. States that intervene have the mechanisms in place to defend, 
secure, and help provide aid to states that they occupy. Non-state actors do not have the same resources and it 
therefore seems the two have different duties post-conflict. Non-state actors are in the business of defense and 
protection, not state-building. The role a non-state actor should have in such an intervention is eloquently 
stated by Emerton and Handfield; “a properly constituted international force, however, should be a force that is 
understood on all sides to be limited in its ambitions. Like the police officer, it will enter the territory to try to 
stop violence, but it will not seek any ongoing control, nor will it seek to appropriate property.“78 Understanding 
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this limitation means understanding the true role of the humanitarian non-state actor, pure defense and 
protection of affected civilians. Rebuilding simply does not pertain to the non-state actor's role. This does 
perhaps hinder its efficacy as state-building is a large part of what states offer to a humanitarian intervention. 
Unfortunately, the way states often act does not seem to uphold universal human rights as much as it does 
Liberalism and personal political goals. Not participating in the restructuring of a post-conflict state can 
certainly be a gamble. But if the non-state actors' actions only helped prevent more destruction, then one could 
argue their actions are net positive, even if they are called back to that country three years later to suppress a 
genocide from the new regime. Perhaps occupation from the non-state actor could occur in a way that secures 
the autonomy of the people but the non-state actor could not be involved in the rebuilding process itself as 
states tend to want to do. Occupation may be necessary to prevent further atrocities from taking place until a 
legitimate government can be setup but the non-state actor should not actively help to restructure the 
government. If autonomy of individuals is to be respected, and it is, then we should let people freely create the 
government they see fit for themselves. If in the process they create a despotic regime, then occupation until 
the recreation of a legitimate state occurs may be necessary to quell such despots.  
Again, the point is not to state if and how a non-state actor should occupy, as this is far too much to get into for 
these purposes. I will only quickly note that a non-state actor should be able to occupy a state as long as its 
within the confines of protecting civilians. On the other hand, state-building does not seem to be a reasonable 
power for the non-state actor to hold, to the extent that it might make it lose its legitimacy in intervention. 
 
Conclusion 
Patrick Emerton and Toby Handfield note the advantages that an 'international humanitarian intervention force' 
may have. For instance they could avoid many of the issues state or regional alliance forces typically have and 
they could act alongside but more prudently than UN peacekeepers.79 They did not specify which form such an 
intervention force should take but I believe a non-state version of an 'international humanitarian intervention 
force' could be the best iteration of such an institution. IGO or quasi-state equivalents may have more political 
matters at stake making them more inclined to power gains of their own. On the other hand, becoming a 
despotic or domineering world police force is one considerable worry with their proposed institution.80 
Hopefully this can be avoided by making the intervention force a non-state actor and subject to international 
accountability. 
In this paper it has been shown that sovereignty can be lost if one uses a minimal notion of universal human 
rights (gross violations of human rights). It has also been shown that the moral legitimacy of the actors in a 
                                                 
79 Emerton and Handfield, 18-19. 
80 Emerton and Handfield, 18. 
21 
 
humanitarian intervention is not dependent on their being states or non-states but by virtue of other criteria, 
namely internal and external legitimacy, and how the two types of actors can have internal and external 
legitimacy conferred. Lastly, there are proper ways of an actor maintaining legitimacy while carrying out an 
intervention by following rules of conduct in a conflict. Permissibility to intervene is not determined based on 
the actor being a state or non-state, but by virtue of the state being intervened on losing its legitimate 
sovereignty. As well, nothing excludes the non-state actor from being legitimate in intervention, whereas there 
are differences between a state and a non-state in how to maintain it. The nuance inherent in these arguments 
shapes what type of 'international humanitarian intervention force' such a non-state actor may be, and we are 
left with a clear picture of what the humanitarian non-state actor may look like. Hopefully the possible 
drawbacks of such an institution can be avoided by adhering to strict moral standards and acting in line with 
international legal institutions where possible (while maintaining a willingness to comply). There might be other 
problems than those mentioned in this paper, and these will need to be addressed with further research. But 
the benefits of a 'humanitarian non-state actor' could be immense and could possibly outweigh many of the 
drawbacks. Having a last line of defense for civilians whose human rights are being grossly violated could 
provide the world the global police force we have needed for decades or millenia. 
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